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THE USE OF LEGAL MECHANISMS TO PROVIDE FOR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 
Edward J. Sullivan and Robert Williams†‡ 
 
“I am completely penniless, and absolutely homeless. Yet there are 
worse things in the world than that . . . . I would not a bit mind 
sleeping in the cool grass in summer, and when winter came on 
sheltering myself by the warm close-thatched rick, or under the 
penthouse of a great barn, provided I had love in my heart.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Love and shelter are essential elements of human life. This paper concerns 
itself with shelter. National, regional, and local governments around the world are 
concerned with the supply of affordable housing. Some governments provide 
direct or indirect subsidies for land acquisition, construction, and upkeep of this 
housing; others require public or private developers to supply such housing; and 
still others attempt a combination of these approaches. This paper focuses on the 
use of legal mechanisms to require developers to “set aside” portions of 
residential development for affordable housing, however defined, in order to 
bridge the gap between market price and a certain level of household income. In 
particular, this paper discusses the use of these mechanisms in England and the 
United States. 
The use of legal mechanisms to require the provision of affordable 
housing has obvious impacts on the housing market, as the developer will likely 
receive less in return for providing affordable units than what that the market 
would ordinarily supply. In response, the developer must either seek government 
incentives to mitigate the damage or “swallow” the differential. There are obvious 
political, social, and economic arguments that may be raised to either limit or 
 
 B.A., St. John’s University (N.Y.), 1966; J.D., Willamette University, 1969; M.A. (History), 
Portland State University, 1973; Urban Studies Certificate, Portland State University, 1974; M.A. 
(Political Thought), University of Durham, 1998; Diploma in Law, University College, Oxford, 
1984; LL.M., University College, London, 1978. 
† LL.B., University College, London, 2006. Practising Barrister at Law in England and Wales. 
‡ The authors acknowledge and express their gratitude to Caleb Huegel, J.D. Expected 2020, 
Willamette University, for his assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1 OSCAR WILDE, DE PROFUNDIS (1905). 
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expand the use of these mechanisms, or to justify incentives. These are matters for 
the political branch to consider. However, there are also constitutional and other 
legal limitations on the use of these mechanisms that must be considered in order 
to assess their utility as a planning tool. 
This paper compares the use of legal mechanisms to encourage or require 
the provision of affordable housing in England and the United States and 
evaluatesconstitutional or other legal challenges to those mechanisms. The 
following section is a brief description of these mechanisms as currently used in 
the two jurisdictions under consideration. 
A. Set-Asides and Inclusionary Housing Efforts in the United States 
In the United States, there is no national system of general land use 
control. Rather, individual states authorize local governments to plan and regulate 
land use under their own statutory schemes, subject only to federal and state 
constitutional limitations. Of those fifty states, “set-asides” have been used most 
extensively in California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.2 The programs in these 
states vary widely in several respects: from being voluntary to mandatory, from 
applying under general law to being imposed on an ad hoc basis, from focusing 
on home ownership to rental housing, from requiring on-site affordable units to 
allowing them off-site, and in setting applicant qualifications and developer 
incentives.3 Typically, however, housing units are designated for low- or 
 
2 See EMILY THADEN & RUONIU WANG, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING 
IN THE UNITED STATES: PREVALENCE, IMPACT, AND PRACTICES 1 (2017), 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/thaden_wp17et1_0.pdf (“[I]nclusionary 
housing programs are heavily concentrated in three states: New Jersey, California, and 
Massachusetts, accounting for nearly 80 percent of all programs.”). This study of 1,379 programs 
in 791 jurisdictions is the latest and most extensive review of inclusionary housing programs in the 
United States. See id. at 56. Unlike the United Nations, the United States does not recognize a 
right to adequate housing. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 21: THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 1 (Rev. 1 2009), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf. 
3 See THADEN & WANG, supra note 2, passim. According to this study, of the known jurisdictions 
with inclusionary housing programs, those that responded had constructed 173,707 affordable 
housing units and had collected $1.7 billion in fees for affordable housing. See id. at 58. While 
many of these programs are locally-oriented, California, New Jersey, and Massachusetts have 
extensive state programs to encourage affordable housing. See id. at 26–31; see also Benjamin 
Schneider, CityLab University: Inclusionary Zoning, CITYLAB (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/07/citylab-university-inclusionary-zoning/565181/;  
BRIAN STROMBERG & LISA STURTEVANT, NAT’L HOUSING CONFERENCE, WHAT MAKES 
INCLUSIONARY ZONING HAPPEN? (2016), 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/19cfbe_2b02286eba264acd872fd2edb3d0cb8f.pdf; Inclusionary 
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moderate-income occupancy, applicants for that housing are eligible based on 
household income, and eligible applicants may then occupy the housing while 
they remain eligible. Provision is usually made so that the initial owner or renter 
cannot “flip” the housing to an ineligible occupant and pocket the difference. 
While other authors have dealt with the myriad details of inclusionary housing 
programs in the United States, this paper deals with those programs involving 
development conditions. This discrete subset of obligations includes requirements 
imposed by local governments not only through generally-applicable schedules 
(for example, a requirement to provide one below-market unit for every 25 market 
units), but also by way of development conditions on individual projects. 
Our analysis of ad hoc development conditions comports with the 
approach of the United States Supreme Court in regulatory takings cases, in 
which the possibility of unfairness in a public permit process, where the regulator 
or another public agency is also seen as the beneficiary of the condition it 
imposes, results in a more intensive review of these conditions.4 Moreover, this 
analysis also comports with the most frequent constitutional weapons for 
challenging development conditions: substantive due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment5 and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.6 
While the Court has not overtly distinguished generally-applicable 
development requirements, it has signaled that adherence to a policy structure 
may allow for more deference in constitutional adjudication.7 Thus, we will 
 
Zoning, WORLD BANK, https://urban-regeneration.worldbank.org/node/46 (last visited Oct. 24, 
2019). 
4 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
7 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“JUSTICE STEVENS’ dissent takes us to task 
for placing the burden on the city to justify the required dedication. He is correct in arguing that in 
evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party 
challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. 
See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city 
made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an 
individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U. S. at 
836.”). While the Supreme Court has yet to speak further regarding this distinction, it may do so in 
the near future. See Kriston Capps, Will the Supreme Court Strike Down Inclusionary Zoning?, 
CITYLAB (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/10/supreme-court-inclusionary-
zoning-constitutional-takings-clause/596863/. 
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undertake an analysis of American development conditions as involving either 
their ad hoc imposition or their imposition under general code requirements 
applicable to like situations. 
B. The English Planning System and Developer Contributions 
In England, the state strictly regulates development, requiring those who 
wish to develop8 land to obtain development consent, or “planning permission,” 
which is ordinarily granted by local planning authorities.9 Although local 
authorities have broad discretion to grant or deny planning permission for 
development, that discretion is not unfettered. Local authorities are required by 
statute to decide applications for planning permission in accordance with the 
“development plan” for their area, “unless material considerations indicate 
otherwise.”10 However, it is for the decision-maker (i.e., the local authority) to 
determine whether a particular proposal is in accordance with the development 
plan, or whether material considerations justify granting permission for a proposal 
notwithstanding deviation from the plan. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the 
local authority to draft and review “local plans”—land use plans which form the 
central tenet of the development plan.11 Local plans, which generally span a 
period of fifteen to twenty years, set out a vision and framework for the future 
development of their area. It can therefore be seen that, in England, local 
government plays a significant role in the planning system: both in terms of plan-
making and decision-making. 
Central government, namely the Secretary of State for Housing, 
Communities, and Local Government, also plays an important role in the English 
planning system. The Secretary of State promulgates national policy in the form 
of the National Planning Policy Framework.12 This has a significant influence on 
 
8 “Development” constitutes either operational development (building, engineering, mining, etc.) 
or a material change in the use of land. See Town and Country Planning Act 1990, c. 8, § 55(1). 
9 In this paper we focus on the development consent regime under the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990, pursuant to which the majority of development is consented, including virtually all 
proposals for housing. Nationally significant infrastructure projects fall outside this regime. See 
Planning Act 2008, c. 29, §§ 14–30A. 
10 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, c. 5, § 38(6) (emphasis added). 
11 See id. § 17(7) (za); The Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 
2012, SI 2012/767. 
12 See MINISTRY OF HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL PLANNING 
POLICY FRAMEWORK, 2019, Cm. 48 (Eng.) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
810197/NPPF_Feb_2019_revised.pdf [hereinafter NPPF]. 
395
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 25
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/25
  
the planning system in at least two ways. First, local plans are required, as a 
matter of policy, to be consistent with the National Planning Policy Framework.13 
Second, national policy is invariably an important material consideration when 
local authorities are determining whether to grant planning permission. For 
instance, compliance with national policy can justify granting such permission 
even where the local plan would not support it.14 In addition, the Secretary of 
State hears appeals of local planning permission denials and, for significant or 
controversial developments, “calls-in” the application and makes a decision 
themselves—taking the decision out of the local authority’s hands.15 
Set-asides, or “developer contributions” as they are commonly known in 
the United Kingdom, are a familiar part of the English planning system and, of all 
developer contributions, those for affordable housing are the most prevalent.16 
National policy requires local plans to make “sufficient provision” for, inter alia, 
affordable housing,17 and securing planning permission for residential 
developments of ten or more dwellings will ordinarily be contingent on a 
proportion of those dwellings being affordable.18 Failure by a landowner-
developer to provide a sufficient amount of affordable housing can, and often 
does, justify a refusal to grant planning permission.19 
 
13 See id. ¶ 35(d). 
14 It is widely accepted that, while the precise relevance varies from case to case, national policy 
will ordinarily be an important material consideration when applying the statutory test and 
determining whether to “depart” from the development plan. See supra note 10 and accompanying 
text. 
15 See Town and Country Planning Act 1990, c. 8, § 77. 
16 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
17 NPPF, supra note 12, ¶ 20(a). 
18 National policy indicates that provision of affordable housing should not be sought for 
residential developments below this threshold, though the threshold can be lower in designated 
rural areas if established through a local plan. See NPPF, supra note 12, ¶ 63. In practice, most 
developments of ten or more residential dwellings will be expected to provide a level of affordable 
housing. 
19 By way of a recent example, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local 
Government—to whom appeals from local planning permission denials are made—refused to 
grant planning permission for a residential redevelopment which would have provided 340 
dwellings in central London, primarily on the basis that it would have provided an inadequate 
amount of affordable housing. See Land at Williams Sutton Estate, APP/K5600/W/17/3177810 
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II. USE OF CONDITIONS TO PROVIDE AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE 
UNITED STATES  
A. Federal Statutes 
Under the American federal system, a local government seeking to use 
development conditions to augment the supply of affordable housing must first 
contend with applicable constitutional and statutory limitations. Statutory 
limitations on the use of development conditions may involve the legitimacy of a 
legislative delegation of power to the local government to impose those 
conditions or limitations placed on the use of that power by the legislature. While 
the federal government may indirectly affect the supply of affordable housing 
through various funding mechanisms20 or through substantive legislation,21 it has, 
for better or worse, largely declined to participate in local land use decisions.22 
Thus, limitations on land use regulations and actions are most often imposed 
under either federal or state constitutions, or state laws.23 
 
20 Federally-funded housing programs for low-income, elderly, and disabled individuals and 
families include public housing (i.e., state-owned, affordable rental houses or apartments), the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program (formerly known as “Section 8 Vouchers”), and competitive 
grants administered by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. See Find 
Affordable Rental Housing, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/finding-home (last visited Oct. 24, 
2019); Grants Management and Oversight Division, HUD.GOV, 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/spm/gmomgmt (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
21 The federal government is authorized to combat discrimination in housing, inter alia, on the 
basis of race, color, and familial status under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended by the 
Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631, and on the basis of 
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
22 This is not to say that the federal government cannot participate in those decisions. Its vast 
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The [United 
States] Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”), give it wide authority to interpose itself in 
housing issues, as it has done with the Fair Housing and Americans with Disabilities Acts. See 
supra note 21. However, since the first zoning case, land use has generally been viewed as a state 
and local government issue in the United States. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926). 
23 On the other hand, while not substantive in nature, three post-Civil War amendments to the 
federal constitution, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ending slavery), XIV (establishing rights and 
remedies for citizens), XV (prohibiting denial of voting rights based on previous condition of 
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B. The Federal Constitution 
Although a number of federal constitutional provisions might apply to 
land use regulations (such as freedom of expression under the First Amendment 
as applied to signs and billboards24 or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment25), the principal grounds on which the nature or extent of 
land use regulations are challenged under federal constitutional law have been 
either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
While there was a Due Process Clause in Bill of Rights, 26 which amended 
the original 1787 Constitution, those provisions were enacted to limit only the 
powers of the federal government, rather than those of the states or their local 
governments.27 Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, 
 
servitude), changed the architecture of the constitution so as to create civil rights that are federally-
enforceable against state and, by extension, local governments. Today, federal law provides for 
remedies against “[e]very person who, under color of . . . any State or Territory . . . subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of [civil] rights,” 
including damages, attorney fees, and costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988. 
24 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
25 Although Equal Protection may apply to land use regulations, most courts defer to local 
classifications unless a protected constitutional right (such as speech or religion) or a protected 
class (distinguished by race, religion, or color) is involved. See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365. But see 
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 
562 (2000). Absent these exceptions, challenges to land use regulations under the Equal Protection 
Clause have been examined under a deferential “rational basis” standard. See Doug Linder, Levels 
of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
26 The Fifth Amendment provides that: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
27 See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
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which contained its own Due Process Clause applying specifically to the states,28 
the United States Supreme Court determined that most provisions of the Bill of 
Rights applied to the states as well, a process referred to as “incorporation.”29 
Yet, apart from incorporation, American courts interpreted the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment somewhat differently than its 
original iteration in the Fifth Amendment.30 From the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century31 until almost 1940,32 the American courts reviewed legislation 
so as to effectively second-guess the policy decisions made by federal, state, and 
local governments under a peculiar interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
which gave them power to declare those decisions “unreasonable”: 
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the 
public, it must appear first that the interests of the public generally, 
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such 
interference, and second that the means are reasonably necessary 
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive 
upon individuals.33 
 
28 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The Amendment also provides that Congress 
may enforce its provisions “by appropriate legislation.” Id. § 5. 
29 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S 652 (1925) (free speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940) (religion); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961) (unreasonable search and seizure); Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 
U.S. 226 (1897) (taking of property without just compensation). 
30 For two very different views on the subject, see Ryan Williams, The One and Only Substantive 
Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010); Edwin Chemerinski, Substantive Due Process, 15 
TOURO L. REV. 1501 (1999). 
31 See e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
32 See e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). 
33 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). 
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It was the courts, of course, that judged the appropriateness of the legislation’s 
ends, means, nature, and degree of application. This doctrine, known as 
“substantive due process,” portends that there are substantive limits on policy-
making, which judges are specially qualified to apprehend in determining the 
validity of those policies. Under the doctrine, legislation is frequently challenged 
as being “arbitrary and capricious” or having no “substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” 
The sequence of history is important because it was during this period of 
intrusive judicial scrutiny that the United States Supreme Court decided the first 
four American land use cases.34 Each of these decisions was based on substantive 
due process challenges. In Euclid, the Court found that the use of zoning as a land 
use regulatory tool was not facially unconstitutional.35 The result in Zahn was 
similar.36 In Nectow, however, the Court affirmed the judgments of the lower 
courts that the land use regulation at issue was unreasonable as applied to an 
individual property, but did not disturb the validity of the remainder of the zoning 
ordinance.37 Finally, Roberge involved the ability of a neighboring owner to 
 
34 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Bd. of Public Works, 
274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Washington ex rel. 
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
35 Using classic substantive due process language, the Court concluded that the village’s 
arguments were “sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the 
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.” Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
36 Justice Sutherland, who wrote the majority opinion in Euclid, also wrote the unanimous opinion 
in Zahn, where he reached a similar conclusion using substantive due process terminology: 
The common council of the city, upon these and other facts, concluded that the 
public welfare would be promoted by constituting the area, including the 
property of plaintiffs in error, a zone “B” district, and it is impossible for us to 
say that their conclusion in that respect was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The most that can be said is that whether that determination was an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable. In such 
circumstances, the settled rule of this Court is that it will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and 
responsibility of determining the question. 
Zahn, 274 U.S. at 328. 
37 Justice Sutherland again wrote a unanimous opinion, wherein he concluded that: 
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general 
rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, 
and, other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear 
a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
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unilaterally change a zoning restriction under Seattle’s zoning regulations, which 
the Court found to be an unconstitutional delegation of authority, enabling 
adjacent landowners to effectively veto otherwise compatible and lawful uses.38 
The United States Supreme Court did not review another land use case 
until 1974.39 By this time, substantive due process was no longer the weapon of 
choice against government regulation, particularly in the economic and social 
spheres. The recognizable sign of this transition was United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.,40 which indicated that traditional substantive due process under the 
federal constitution was, for all intents and purposes, no longer available.41 
 
Here, the express finding of the master, already quoted, confirmed by the court 
below, is that the health, safety, convenience, and general welfare of the 
inhabitants of the part of the city affected will not be promoted by the 
disposition made by the ordinance of the locus in question. This finding of the 
master, after a hearing and an inspection of the entire area affected, supported, 
as we think it is, by other findings of fact, is determinative of the case. 
Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 (citation omitted). 
38 In another unanimous opinion, this time authored by Justice Butler, the Court concluded that: 
The right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is property within 
the protection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed by the record make it clear 
that the exclusion of the new home from the first district is not indispensable to 
the general zoning plan. And there is no legislative determination that the 
proposed building and use would be inconsistent with public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare. The enactment itself plainly implies the contrary. 
The grant of permission for such building and use, although purporting to be 
subject to such consents, shows that the legislative body found that the 
construction and maintenance of the new home was in harmony with the public 
interest and with the general scope and plan of the zoning ordinance. The section 
purports to give the owners of less than one-half the land within 400 feet of the 
proposed building authority—uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by 
legislative action—to prevent the trustee from using its land for the proposed 
home. The superintendent is bound by the decision or inaction of such owners. 
There is no provision for review under the ordinance; their failure to give 
consent is final. They are not bound by any official duty, but are free to withhold 
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and may subject the trustee to their will 
or caprice. The delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121–22 (citations omitted). 
39 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
40 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In the now-famous footnote 4, the Court indicated that it would no longer 
review the substance of legislation in these spheres, but would instead reserve its scrutiny for 
defects in the political process: 
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Since Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York42 in 1978, the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has become the primary instrument for 
challenging government overreach in the field of land use regulation.43 The 
Supreme Court had not considered the limits of land use regulation since the 
 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which 
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal 
of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other 
types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the 
dissemination of information, on interferences with political organizations, as to 
prohibition of peaceable assembly. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or racial minorities. 
[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
Id., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). 
41 Nevertheless, many states have due process clauses in their respective state constitutions and 
many state courts have imported the pre-1938 federal interpretation of substantive due process into 
their own decisions. See Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process:” Unconstitutional Law in 
Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970) (suggesting that, even in the absence of a due process clause 
in state constitutions, appellate courts have simply assumed its existence and applicability despite 
changes in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution). Moreover, the doctrine 
has never been expressly overruled and is still used occasionally by the Supreme Court in land use 
cases. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. 1; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). It has 
also been used, albeit with different terminology, in more controversial cases. See, e.g., Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (consensual 
sexual activity). 
42 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
43 During this long hiatus, there was at least one major case that peripherally involved land use 
regulations. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). In that case, the petitioner 
owned a sand- and gravel-mining operation, which began before zoning was first applied to his 
site. See id. at 591. When the town adopted its zoning ordinance, the petitioner successfully 
avoided increased levels of regulation because his use was lawfully nonconforming and thus could 
continue. See id. Later, the town adopted new, non-zoning safety regulations that had a significant 
economic impact on the petitioner’s operations. See id. at 592. Because the Court ultimately 
upheld these regulations under a substantive due process analysis, this case may very well have 
convinced landowners that a different constitutional theory was needed to successfully challenge 
economic regulations. See id. at 595–96. 
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series of four cases it decided in the 1920s. In the decades that followed, while 
substantive due process had ultimately proven to be an unsuccessful weapon for 
landowners, the Takings Clause became an effective substitute when the Court 
eventually resurrected another doctrine that had fairly languished since the 1920s. 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,44 a coal company, which had retained 
mining rights under a residence, challenged a state statute prohibiting the exercise 
of those rights. The Supreme Court found that the statute, as applied to the subject 
property, violated the Takings Clause since the only property interest held by the 
coal company was the right to mine.45 Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, 
opined that, while regulations affecting property values are a feature of everyday 
life, regulations that go “too far” require just compensation in order to sustain 
them.46 This indeterminate calculus was given substance over fifty years later in 
Penn Central, which, in addition to stressing the importance of the circumstances 
of each case, provided three “factors” for determining whether a regulation has 
gone “too far”: 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the 
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have 
particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of 
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the 
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when 
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical 
invasion by government than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life 
to promote the common good.47 
For more than forty years, Penn Central has been the default test for 
evaluating takings claims under the Fifth Amendment in the field of land use 
regulation. However, there are two situations in which courts will almost always 
find that a taking has occurred. These are known as per se or categorical takings: 
 
44 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
45 Id. at 418. 
46 Id. at 415. 
47 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted). 
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1. The first instance occurs when government either causes or authorizes 
another to undertake a physical invasion of private property.48 
2. The second instance occurs where “the State seeks to sustain 
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, [in 
which case] it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent 
inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed 
use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”49 Thus, denial of 
all viable economic use, at least where the construction of a single-
family house is concerned, will usually trigger a valid compensation 
claim unless there are other property interests involved (for example, if 
the state retains a property interest in a streambed) or the use is 
characterized as a common law nuisance.50 
Having set out the general parameters of the limitations imposed by the 
Takings Clause, we now turn to its application to conditions generally and, 
finally, to the use of conditions to provide for affordable housing. A trilogy of 
Supreme Court cases sets out Takings Clause limitations on the use of 
development conditions. Briefly stated, they are: 
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, which requires an “essential 
nexus” between the condition imposed and the purpose of the 
 
48 See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (arising when the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authorized routine water releases from upstream dams that flooded 
state-owned forests and damaged merchantable timber); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a city-authorized physical invasion to allow cable 
access for apartment tenants was a taking and that a uniform $1 payment could therefore be 
contested as “just compensation”). 
49 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). After noting the other per se 
takings category, physical occupation, the court added: 
We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e., 
regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: any limitation 
so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but 
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law 
or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate 
the result that could have been achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners 
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or 
by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the 
public generally, or otherwise. 
Id. at 1029. 
50 See id. at 1029–30. 
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restriction that would justify denial of the permit.51 The use of a 
condition to obtain an easement that the government would otherwise 
be constitutionally-obligated to pay for, where the easement does 
nothing to alleviate the government’s concerns regarding the 
development, converts the permit proceeding into an “an out-and-out 
plan of extortion.”52 
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard, in which there was arguably an essential 
nexus for conditions requiring a plumbing supply store to dedicate 
property for a bike path and flood protection along an adjacent creek, 
but where the degree of connection between the purpose of the 
conditions and their burden on the individual landowner was at issue.53 
In that case, the Supreme Court required a showing of “rough 
proportionality” to justify conditions that do not arise from a general 
requirement under local land use regulations.54 
3. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, which 
reaffirmed the essential nexus and rough proportionality holdings of 
Nollan and Dolan but extended their application to conditions 
involving money and the undertaking of public works.55 
Thus, Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz might apply to conditions requiring the 
provision of affordable housing as part of development approval, known in some 
 
51 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). Justice Scalia’s majority opinion noted that there is a broad range of 
public interests which could justify denial of a permit, and for which the imposition of a condition 
could be justified as a substitute for denial, and added: 
We assume, without deciding, that this is so—in which case, the Commission 
unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their permit outright if their 
new house (alone, or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in 
conjunction with other construction) would substantially impede these purposes, 
unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their 
property as to constitute a taking. 
Id. at 835–36 (citation omitted). 
52 Id. at 837. 
53 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
54 Id. at 391 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“We think a term such as ‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates 
what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation 
is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”). 
55 570 U.S. 595, 618–19 (2013). 
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American jurisdictions as “inclusionary zoning.”56 The argument advanced by the 
landowner-development community against inclusionary zoning is that the 
construction of additional housing does not, by itself, create the need for 
affordable housing and, therefore, inclusionary zoning does not pass muster under 
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.57 
The Supreme Court, then with a complement of eight justices following 
the death of Justice Scalia, declined to decide this issue in 2016 and it remains 
unsettled.58 That case was California Building Industries Ass’n v. City of San 
Jose,59 which dealt extensively with the federal (and state) constitutional issues 
surrounding inclusionary zoning or set-asides and which involved a facial 
challenge to an ordinance requiring all new residential developments of twenty or 
more units to sell at least fifteen percent of them at a price affordable to low- or 
moderate-income households.60 Although the principal challenge was based on 
the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution and a similar provision of the 
state constitution, the landowner specifically raised the “unconstitutional 
conditions” language used in Dolan and Koontz.61 
The California Supreme Court rejected these challenges. Given the mere 
regulatory nature of the ordinance, the court found that no exaction had occurred 
 
56 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 3. This article provides an example of inclusionary zoning in 
practice: 
In Washington, D.C.’s rapidly gentrifying Petworth neighborhood, the recently 
opened Fahrenheit building could easily be seen as a symbol of the area’s 
increasing unaffordability. Its bright red exterior and ground-floor craft cider 
house send a powerful signal about the price of the apartments above, which 
range from $2,400 to $2,745 for a two-bedroom unit. But all is not as it seems. 
Three of the Fahrenheit’s 31 units are available at below market rates as part of 
the District’s inclusionary zoning (IZ) program, which, in fiscal year 2016, 
offered two-bedroom apartments for an average rent of $1,636. 
Id.; see also Dan Bertolet & Alan Durning, Inclusionary Zoning: The Most Promising—
or Counter-Productive—of All Housing Policies, SIGHTLINE INST. (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.sightline.org/2016/11/29/inclusionary-zoning-the-most-promising-or-
counter-productive-of-all-housing-policies/. 
57 See, e.g., James W. Ely Jr., David Callies and the Future of Land Use Regulations, 7 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RIGHTS CONF. J. 63 (2018). 
58 See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (denying certiorari). 
59 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015). 
60 See id. at 978. 
61 See id. at 987–88. 
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and no claim for an unconstitutional condition existed.62 Unlike the ad hoc 
circumstances of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, the city did not acquire any property 
or money, or require that the landowner perform any public works on its behalf.63 
While noting the “ambiguity” of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz’s application to 
legislative actions such as fee schedules and set-asides, the court observed that the 
California courts had not yet extended those cases that far,64 and instead 
compared the set-asides at issue to regulations such as those prohibiting drive-in 
windows at restaurants, requiring handrails in multi-family residences, and 
requiring certain amounts of parking at commercial facilities.65 The court 
characterized the challenged ordinance as simply regulating the use of property by 
limiting the sales price of some homes in the interests of the community at large,66 
 
62 See id. at 991. 
63 See id. at 988–91, 995. 
64 See id. at 990–91, 990 n.11. The court added that “[a] predicate for any unconstitutional 
conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person 
asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing,” and noted the 
separation of due process from takings jurisprudence which justifies a takings analysis only for 
conditions so onerous that, outside the permit process, they would constitute a per se taking. Id. at 
990 (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 612 (2013)) (citing 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)). The court concluded: 
Nothing in Koontz suggests that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine under 
Nollan and Dolan would apply where the government simply restricts the use of 
property without demanding the conveyance of some identifiable protected 
property interest (a dedication of property or the payment of money) as a 
condition of approval. It is the governmental requirement that the property 
owner convey some identifiable property interest that constitutes a so-called 
“exaction” under the takings clause and that brings the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine into play. 
Id. 
65 See id. at 991.  
66 See id. at 992. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court had previously upheld a 
city’s rent control provisions against a takings challenge as merely a restriction on use. See id. 
(citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992)). Citing other authority in which 
regulations of use—even when stringent—did not amount to a taking, the court concluded that: 
As a general matter, so long as a land use regulation does not constitute a 
physical taking or deprive a property owner of all viable economic use of the 
property, such a restriction does not violate the takings clause insofar as it 
governs a property owner’s future use of his or her property, except in the 
unusual circumstance in which the use restriction is properly found to go “too 
far” and to constitute a “regulatory taking” under the ad hoc, multifactored test 
discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104. 
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observing that price controls have long been recognized as a valid regulatory tool, 
subject to constitutional limitations.67 Thus, the court concluded: 
[T]he basic requirement imposed by the challenged ordinance—
conditioning the grant of a development permit for new 
developments of more than 20 units upon a developer’s agreement 
to offer for sale at an affordable housing price at least 15 percent of 
the on-site for-sale units—does not constitute an exaction for 
purposes of the takings clause so as to bring into play the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine under the Nollan, Dolan, and 
Koontz decisions.68 
III. THE DELIVERY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN ENGLAND  
A. Context 
The level and type of affordable housing that will ordinarily be required 
from residential development is established in policies promulgated by local 
authorities through local plans.69 These requirements are generally expressed by 
way of a percentage or proportion of the total number of dwellings to be delivered 
 
Id. at 991–92 (footnote omitted). The court noted that the plaintiff association specifically 
disclaimed use of the “multifactored” Penn Central test, preferring to rest its case on the 
conditions trilogy of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. Id. at 994. Similarly, the plaintiff association 
made no claim that the set-asides prevented its member-developers from achieving a reasonable 
return on their investments. See id. at 993. 
67 See id. at 992–93. The court also noted the other means by which an applicant could satisfy the 
ordinance: payment of a fee or construction of other housing off-site. See id. at 983. Since those 
alternatives were available, the court found no basis for challenging the ordinance as a taking. See 
id. at 996. 
68 See id. at 996. After addressing several of the plaintiff association’s other arguments, the court 
reflected more broadly on its role in dealing with legislation: 
As noted at the outset of this opinion, for many decades California statutes and 
judicial decisions have recognized the critical need for more affordable housing 
in this state. Over the years, a variety of means have been advanced and 
undertaken to address this challenging need. We emphasize that the legal 
question before our court in this case is not the wisdom or efficacy of the 
particular tool or method that the City of San Jose has adopted, but simply 
whether, as the Court of Appeal held, the San Jose ordinance is subject to the 
ordinary standard of judicial review to which legislative land use regulations 
have traditionally been subjected. 
Id. at 1006. 
69 See NPPF, supra note 12, ¶¶ 34, 61–62. 
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by the development. National policy requires that local plans make “sufficient 
provision” for affordable housing,70 though this requirement is tempered by the 
stipulation that affordable housing contributions should not be set at levels which 
would “undermine the deliverability of the plan.”71 In particular, when local plans 
are examined by the Secretary of State, which they must be prior to adoption, 
consideration is given as to whether the affordable housing requirement is set at a 
level which would render development unviable (taking into account, inter alia, 
other likely contributions such as education, health, transportation, flood and 
water management, and infrastructure).72 
In London, where the affordable housing need is extremely high, the new 
Draft London Plan is proposing a minimum threshold requirement that between 
thirty-five and fifty percent of all new homes be affordable (depending on their 
location and source).73 By contrast, the recently-adopted local plan for 
Kirklees74—where the affordable housing need is less pressing and where 
viability issues are in play—requires that at least twenty percent of new homes be 
affordable. Thus, the “requirement” to provide affordable housing within English 
planning law is ultimately found only in policy. There is no statutory obligation 
requiring its provision.75 A hallmark of policy—and a feature which distinguishes 
it from law—is that public bodies are not bound to follow it. This means that local 
authorities can depart from their local plans’ affordable housing requirements 
when circumstances demand, so long as they give adequate reasons for doing so. 
The statutory test for deciding planning permission applications reflects 
this long-standing legal position. Although Parliament has established a “statutory 
 
70 NPPF, supra note 12, ¶ 20. 
71 NPPF, supra note 12, ¶ 34. 
72 See id. 
73 MAYOR OF LONDON, THE DRAFT LONDON PLAN, Policy H5(A), H6(B) (2019), 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/draft_london_plan_-
_consolidated_changes_version_-_clean_july_2019.pdf. 
74 Located in the north of England. 
75 The incumbent Conservative government has flirted with the idea of requiring certain forms of 
housing by way of legislation, going so far as to legislate for the provision of “starter homes,” 
which are considered in national policy to be a form of affordable housing. Housing and Planning 
Act 2016, c. 22, § 2. However, the government has recently confirmed that it will not implement a 
compulsory starter homes percentage requirement. See DEP’T FOR COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, 
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priority” in favor of the development plan (which includes, but is not limited to, 
policies in the local plan), the development plan can be departed from “where 
material considerations indicate otherwise.”76 Thus, while there is a presumption 
that developers will provide “policy-compliant” levels of affordable housing on 
residential sites, it is possible to justify delivery of affordable housing at lower 
levels than those set out in the local plan—or even no delivery at all—on a case-
by-case basis. Arguments are often advanced that the level of affordable housing 
required by the local plan would render the particular development unviable and 
that the benefits of the proposal outweigh the harm of providing a lower level of 
affordable housing. Conversely, developers sometimes offer affordable housing at 
levels above policy-compliance in order to argue that the benefits of the proposal 
ought to justify granting permission in circumstances where it would ordinarily be 
withheld—for instance, when proposing development in the Green Belt.77 
Unlike in the United States, the legal mechanism ordinarily utilized in 
England to secure developer contributions, including for affordable housing, is 
known as a “planning obligation.”78 These obligations are entered into voluntarily 
by the landowner, albeit in the knowledge that, all things being equal, the 
 
76 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, c. 5, § 38(6). 
77 The Metropolitan Green Belt is a planning policy designation intended to control urban growth 
by providing that, with a few exceptions, development within a ring of countryside around major 
urban areas will be resisted. Approximately 12.5% of the land area in England is Green Belt. See 
MINISTRY OF HOUS., COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY GREEN BELT: 
ENGLAND 2017/18, at 1 (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
788115/Green_Belt_Statistics_England_2017-18.pdf. 
78 Planning obligations will be included either in a “section 106 agreement,” to which both the 
local authority and the landowner-developer(s) are party, or a “unilateral undertaking,” offered 
independently by the landowner-developer(s). See Town and Country Planning Act 1990, c. 8, § 
106(1). Historically, local authorities or the Secretary of State were able to attach conditions to 
grants of permission which prevented the development from commencing until a scheme for the 
provision and maintenance of affordable housing had been submitted to and agreed upon by the 
local authority, without the need for consent from the landowner-developer. See id. § 72. This 
provided a mechanism whereby the decision-maker could require the provision of affordable 
housing (or, more specifically, to prevent the commencement of development unless the 
affordable housing provision is secured) if it had not been offered by the landowner-developer in 
advance or if the landowner-developer’s offer was considered insufficient. Recent legislation, 
however, has prevented the imposition of such pre-commencement conditions without the 
landowner-developer’s written agreement. See Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017, c. 20, § 14(1). 
Where the decision-maker believes a certain level of affordable housing is required in order to 
make the development acceptable, and where there is no planning obligation securing provision of 
that housing and no written agreement authorizing the attachment of pre-commencement 
conditions, the application will be denied. 
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application for planning permission is unlikely to succeed if they do not provide 
the requisite level of affordable housing. Planning obligations are enforceable 
against persons entering into them and, crucially, against successors in title as 
well.79 Enforcement typically occurs by way of a court injunction, and provision 
is ordinarily made within the planning obligation to ensure that the housing 
remains affordable in perpetuity.80 
B. Role of the English Planning System in Delivering Affordable 
Housing 
The planning system in England, and in particular the private sector within 
the planning system, now plays a critical role in the delivery of affordable as well 
as market-rate housing. The latest statistics are revealing: 
1. In the first quarter of 2018, 131,480 (82%) of new build dwellings 
were completed by the private sector, with 27,110 (17%) being 
provided by housing associations and only 1,960 (1%) by local 
authorities.81 
2. In 2017–18, 42,757 new build affordable dwellings were completed. 
That is, 27% of all new build completions were affordable houses.82 
3. Of the 42,757 new build affordable dwelling completions in 2017–18, 
just over half (53%) of new build affordable dwelling completions 
were provided by way of planning obligation.83 This contribution has 
 
79 See Town and Country Planning Act 1990, c. 8, § 106(3). 
80 See id. § 106(5). Planning obligations are also classified as local land charges, which would be 
disclosed in a title search. See id. § 106(11). 
81 See MINISTRY OF HOUS., COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, HOUSE BUILDING; NEW BUILD 
DWELLINGS, ENGLAND: DECEMBER QUARTER 2018, at 8 tbl.2b (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
790069/House_Building_Release_Dec_2018.pdf. 
82 See MINISTRY OF HOUS., COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, AFFORDABLE HOUSING SUPPLY: 
APRIL 2017 TO MARCH 2018 ENGLAND 7 (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
758389/Affordable_Housing_Supply_2017-18.pdf. 
83 See MINISTRY OF HOUS., COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, TABLE 1000C NB: ADDITIONAL 
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risen steadily over the last few years (44% in 2015–16; 47% in 2016–
17).84 
4. The value of affordable housing units secured by planning obligations 
in 2016–17 was over £4 billon, representing 67% of all developer 
contributions. This was up from £2 billion in 2005–06, which then 
represented 51% of all developer contributions.85 
It has not always been this way. In the years following World War II, local 
authorities built a significant number of new dwellings.86 This included the 
provision of new affordable housing with the aid of central government subsidies. 
In the 1980s, however, provision of housing by local authorities reduced 
dramatically and has remained at a very minimal level since the 1990s 
(notwithstanding recent signs of a small upturn in local authority 
housebuilding).87 To some degree, this slack was taken up by housing 
associations,88 which, starting in the late 1970s, have delivered between 10,000 
and 30,000 new build dwellings per year.89 Between the mid-1970s and the mid-
1990s, the main mechanism for providing new affordable housing was the 
purchase of sites at market prices by housing associations in order to provide 
 
84 See id. 
85 See MINISTRY OF HOUS., COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, THE INCIDENCE, VALUE AND 
DELIVERY OF PLANNING OBLIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE LEVY IN ENGLAND IN 
2016–17, at 35 tbl.3.1 (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
685301/Section_106_and_CIL_research_report.pdf. In this context, developer contributions 
include contributions to the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), a planning charge introduced 
in 2008 to help deliver infrastructure to support development. See The Community Infrastructure 
Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948. A discussion of CIL falls outside the scope of this paper. 
86 See MINISTRY OF HOUS., COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, TABLE 244: PERMANENT DWELLINGS 
STARTED AND COMPLETED, BY TENURE, ENGLAND, HISTORICAL CALENDAR YEAR SERIES (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
790088/LiveTable244.xlsx [hereinafter TABLE 244]. 
87 Between 1948 and 1980, local authorities delivered over 70,000 homes per year, peaking at 
almost 200,000 in 1953. There was a rapid drop-off in delivery by local authorities during the 
1980s, from almost 75,000 in 1980 to less than 15,000 in 1990. Between 1993 and 2014, delivery 
by local authorities did not exceed 1,500 (save for in 2011). Since 2014, housebuilding by local 
authorities has been in the low thousands. See id. 
88 In broad terms, “housing associations” are organizations providing low-cost social housing on a 
non-profit basis for people in housing need. 
89 See TABLE 244, supra note 86. 
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publicly-subsidized rental housing.90 This enabled new dwellings to be let at 
affordable, below-market rents.91 
Planning policy that supported the provision of affordable housing by the 
private sector was introduced in the 1980s, then with the narrow objective of 
delivering affordable homes in rural areas where it would ordinarily be refused, 
under so-called “rural exceptions” policies.92 National policy steadily developed 
to allow affordable housing on all larger housing sites and, by the late 1990s, 
planning obligations had become an important source of affordable housing 
provision, albeit not to the extent seen today.93 As the national policy supporting 
provision of affordable housing on private developments has been strengthened 
since 2000, and with local authorities now invariably setting minimum 
requirements for the delivery of affordable housing in their local plans, it is 
unsurprising that the planning system—particularly development contributions 
secured through planning obligations—now represents the most significant source 
of affordable housing. 
C. Legal Limits on Developer Contributions in England 
As in other areas of public law, the English courts exercise only 
supervisory jurisdiction over decisions made by local authorities. It is not the 
function of the court to form its own view about the substantive merits of those 
decisions. Instead, the court is restricted to examining whether the decision-maker 
has committed a recognizable public law error: for example, whether the 
procedure was unfair, whether relevant considerations were not taken into account 
or irrelevant considerations were taken into account, or whether the decision was 
irrational.94 Indeed, the courts have regularly and forcefully emphasized the limits 
of their jurisdiction within the planning sphere, repeating the mantra that “matters 
 
90 See Gemma Burgess et al., The Provision of Affordable Housing Through Section 106: The 
Situation in 2007, RICS RES. PAPER SERIES, Oct. 2007, at 11, 
https://www.cchpr.landecon.cam.ac.uk/Research/Start-Year/2007/S106-Affordable-Housing-
Provision-What-is-Going-On/Project-Report/Research-Paper/at_download/file. 
91 See id. 
92 See TONY CROOK ET AL., JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUND., PLANNING GAIN AND AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING: MAKING IT COUNT 1 (2002). 
93 See Burgess et al., supra note 90, at 23 fig.3. 
94 See Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] AC 374 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (setting forth and classifying grounds for judicial review as illegality 
(unlawfulness), irrationality (unreasonableness), and procedural impropriety (unfairness)). 
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of planning judgment” fall solely within the domain of the decision-maker.95 
Thus, questions such as whether the required level of affordable housing 
“undermine[s] the deliverability” of the local plan, whether it is justifiable for a 
particular proposal to deliver less affordable housing the local plan requires, and 
whether the provision of a large amount of affordable housing justifies granting 
permission for a proposal which would otherwise be denied, are all matters for the 
relevant local authority, not the courts. 
It follows that the English courts play a very limited role in regulating the 
amount and nature of affordable housing required by way of developer 
contributions. This is true at both the policy-making level (i.e., the level of 
affordable housing that a local plan should require) and the decision-making level 
(i.e., whether planning permission should be granted or denied in light of the 
amount of affordable housing being offered). There are, however, a number of 
legal limitations on the use of planning obligations, which, as described above, 
are the primary means whereby developer contributions are secured in England. 
The main limitations are vires, common law considerations of materiality, 
statutory restrictions on materiality, European law, and Human Rights law. A 
brief description of each and relevant consideration of the practical degree to 
which they limit the provision of affordable housing via planning obligations 
follows. 
First, planning obligations must not be ultra vires—that is, they must fall 
within the parameters set out in the statute authorizing them.96 The Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990 allows landowners to enter into obligations: 
(a) restricting the development or use of the land in any specified 
way; 
(b) requiring specified operations or activities to be carried out in, 
on, under or over the land; 
(c) requiring the land to be used in any specified way; or 
 
95 Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t [1995] 1 WLR 759 (HL) 780 (Lord Hoffmann) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“If there is one principle of planning law more firmly settled than any 
other, it is that matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local 
authority or the Secretary of State.”). 
96 A public body acts ultra vires where it is acting beyond its prescribed powers or has taken an 
action which is incompatible with its legal authority. See, e.g., R v. London Boroughs Transp. 
Comm. ex p. Freight Transp. Ass’n [1991] 1 WLR 828 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (European 
Community law); Stewart v. Perth & Kinross Council [2004] UKHL 16 (appeal taken from Scot.) 
(domestic law). 
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(d) requiring a sum or sums to be paid to the authority . . . on a 
specified date or dates or periodically.97 
In practice, there is little difficulty in ensuring that planning obligations securing 
the provision of affordable housing come within these requirements. Affordable 
housing is generally provided under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 in 
one of three ways: 
1. On-site provision, in which a proportion of the dwellings in the new 
development must be affordable.98 It is the expectation of national 
policy that affordable housing be provided on-site, unless alternative 
forms of provision can be robustly justified.99 
2. Off-site provision, in which the developer must secure provision of 
affordable housing on a different site, equal to the number of units 
they would have been required to provide on-site.100 In this case, the 
planning obligation prevents development or occupation of the subject 
site until the off-site affordable housing has been completed. 
3. Financial contribution in lieu, in which the developer must pay a 
financial contribution to the local authority for the provision of 
affordable housing.101 In principle, the financial contribution will be 
the amount required to enable the local authority to build or acquire 
the number of affordable units that the developer would have 
otherwise been required to provide on-site. 
It follows that it is extremely unlikely that a properly drafted planning obligation 
securing affordable housing would ever be deemed ultra vires. 
Second, even if a planning obligation is intra vires, it must constitute a 
“material consideration” in order to lawfully affect a decision on whether to grant 
planning permission.102 English common law has always made “a clear distinction 
between the question of whether something is a material consideration and the 
 
97 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, c. 8, § 106(1). 
98 See id. § 106(1)(c). 
99 See NPPF, supra note 12, ¶ 62(a). 
100 See Town and Country Planning Act 1990, c. 8, § 106(1)(a). 
101 See id. § 106(1)(d). 
102 Tesco Stores [1995] 1 WLR at 780.  
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weight which it should be given.”103 The former is a question of law; the latter is a 
question of planning judgment, which, as explained above, is entirely a matter for 
the local authority. In practice, the common law requirement of materiality has 
not acted as a significant restriction on developer contributions, including for the 
provision of affordable housing. This is because the case law has established a 
very low threshold for materiality in the context of planning obligations: in order 
for a planning obligation to be material, it must merely have “more than a trivial 
connection” with the proposed development.104 It is hard to think of a case in 
which the provision of affordable housing would not meet this criterion. 
Third, Parliament has legislated so as to apply a more stringent statutory 
test for the materiality of planning obligations than that found at common law. 
The Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 provide that: 
A planning obligation may only constitute a reason for granting 
planning permission for the development if the obligation is— 
(a) necessary to make the development acceptable in planning 
terms; 
(b) directly related to the development; and 
(c) fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the 
development.105 
Despite the absence of any statutory language expressly indicating that it is for 
local authorities, as opposed to the court, to determine whether these criteria are 
met, the English courts have repeatedly declined invitations to intervene on 
matters of planning judgment. Instead, it has been held that: 
[T]he role for the [local authority] is to apply the law and to judge 
whether the obligation . . . meets the statutory tests. That is a 
matter for his planning judgment. The role of the court is to review 
that judgment on conventional public law principles and no more. 
It is not to step into the [local authority] and start exercising its 
 
103 Id. 
104 Aberdeen City & Shire Strategic Dev. Planning Auth. v. Elsick Dev. Co. [2017] UKSC 66 [63] 
(Lord Hodge SCJ) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
105 Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948, § 122(2). 
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own planning judgment . . . . That would be an impermissible 
exercise of its powers.106 
It is possible to conceive of situations in which a planning obligation 
providing for affordable housing would fail the statutory tests. For instance, a 
financial contribution in lieu of affordable housing might exceed an amount 
which is “fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development.”107 
In most cases, however, so long as the need for affordable housing in the area is 
clearly evidenced (as it will be in most cases through the local plan), and so long 
as the amount of affordable housing or financial contribution in lieu is calculated 
in a transparent and consistent manner, then the planning obligation will be found 
to meet the statutory tests. Moreover, the reluctance of the English courts to enter 
into the arena of “planning merits” and determine for themselves whether the 
statutory tests are satisfied means that the statutory criteria are not always applied 
by local authorities with a consistent degree of rigor. 
In terms of European law (which will not apply directly to the United 
Kingdom if and when Brexit is completed), the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has held that, while imposing a requirement to provide affordable housing 
on economic operators constitutes a restriction of the free movement of capital, it 
“may be justified by requirements relating to social housing policy in a Member 
State as an overriding reason in the public interest.”108 The European Court held 
that it was for the courts of individual member states to determine whether such 
requirements are “necessary and appropriate to attain the objective of 
guaranteeing sufficient housing for the low-income or otherwise disadvantaged 
sections of the local population.”109 
Finally, it should be noted that the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic 
law (and so will continue to apply if Brexit is completed), has not proven to be an 
obstacle to local authorities in requiring the provision of affordable housing on 
residential developments.110 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR establishes a 
person’s right to “peaceful enjoyment of his possessions” and draws a distinction 
 
106 Smyth v. Sec’y of State for Communities & Local Gov’t [2013] EWHC (Admin) 3844 [192] 
(Patterson J), aff’d, [2015] EWCA (Civ) 174. 
107 Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948, § 122(2)(c). 
108 Joined Cases 197/11 & 203/11, Libert v. Gouvernement Flamand, 2013 ECR I-00000, ¶ 67. 
109 Id. ¶ 69. 
110 See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 2 (UK). 
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between the “deprivation of property” and mere “control of use.”111 Both forms of 
interference “must comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a 
legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be 
realised.”112 However, while the former normally requires payment of 
compensation to avoid a breach of the Article, the latter generally does not—even 
if the control results in serious financial loss.113 Moreover, the English courts 
afford the state a “wide margin of appreciation” in relation to the planning policy 
and its implementation.114 There is no reported English case suggesting that the 
principle of requiring developers to provide affordable housing as a pre-requisite 
to the granting of planning permission would be a breach of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1, and it is likely that such a challenge, if it were brought, would receive short 
shift in either the domestic or European courts.115 
As such, there are only limited legal restrictions with respect to the use of, 
and requirement for, planning obligations to secure the provision of affordable 
housing in England. This is not to say that disputes over affordable housing 
provision do not occur. They do. But, rather than playing out in the courts on legal 
grounds, these disputes primarily occur before administrative decision-makers on 
a plan-by-plan and development-by-development basis, and turn on merits-based 
arguments concerning the need for affordable housing in the relevant area and the 
viability of the plan or development at issue. 
IV. APPLES AND ORANGES  
Various local governments in the American and English planning regimes 
have sought to be aggressive in maximizing (within legal and political 
constraints) the supply of low- and moderate-income housing by way of 
regulation and other means exclusive of funding it themselves. There is a well-
documented shortage of housing in the United States, particularly on the low-
 
111 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS & COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2010), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
112 Bäck v. Finland, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 48, ¶ 52 (2005). 
113 See R v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Food & Rural Affairs [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1580 [58]. 
114 Buckley v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101, ¶ 75 (1997). 
115 This is not to say that, on the facts of an individual case, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 could 
never be successfully invoked. It is likely, however, that any such breach would also amount to a 
breach of domestic law. See Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948, § 
122. 
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income end of the spectrum.116 The Supreme Court’s takings and substantive due 
process jurisprudence, combined with a legal-political culture that gives great 
weight to property interests,117 plays a significant role in assessing what state and 
local governments can lawfully undertake to provide for affordable housing by 
way of regulation. 
In England, while the problem of affordable housing is, if anything, more 
pressing—some forty percent of young adults cannot afford even modest homes, 
and the need for social housing continues apace118—the cause cannot seriously be 
attributed to legal restrictions. European, human rights, statutory, and common 
 
116 See Bryce Covert, The Deep, Uniquely American Roots of our Affordable-Housing Crisis, 
NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/give-us-shelter/ (observing that nearly 
half of all American renters cannot afford rent, as it is thirty percent or more of their income, and 
that, at any one time, there are 500,000 homeless individuals in the United States); 151 Years of 
America’s Housing History, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/americas-
housing-history/ (discussing federal and some state efforts related to public housing); NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES (2017), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Gap-Report_2017.pdf (presenting an expansive discussion of 
definitions, the status of all housing at the time, the need for more affordable housing, federal and 
state programs to fulfill that need, and various policy recommendations). 
117 See, e.g., Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which 
justifies differential limitations on property regulation: 
It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his 
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted 
by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; “[a]s long recognized, 
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the 
police power.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. And in the 
case of personal property, by reason of the State’s traditionally high degree of 
control over commercial dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that 
new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at least 
if the property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for 
sale). See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1979) (prohibition on sale of 
eagle feathers). In the case of land, however, we think the notion pressed by the 
Council that title is somehow held subject to the "implied limitation" that the 
State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent 
with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part 
of our constitutional culture. 
505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (emphasis added). 
118 See Press Release, Jonathan Cribb & Polly Simpson, Inst. for Fiscal Studies, Even the Cheapest 
Local Homes are Out of Reach for at Least 40% of Young Adults (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/13471; see also May Bulman, UK Facing its Biggest Housing 
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law requirements do not place any substantive restrictions on what local 
authorities can demand from developers by way of affordable housing. Instead, 
the limitations on affordable housing delivery stem primarily from social, 
political, and economic—rather than legal— considerations. 
To assess the lawfulness of using development conditions and planning 
obligations to require the inclusion of low- and moderate-income housing in the 
jurisdictions under consideration, this paper will consider two separate categories 
of requirements: those imposed by general policy or legislation and those imposed 
on an ad hoc basis. 
A. Requirements Imposed by General Legislation or Policy 
In the United States, there is generally no individualized administrative 
review by state agencies of local plans or land use regulations before their 
adoption and application. American courts, on the other hand, seem unable to 
resist the temptation of reviewing and influencing social policy in the guise of 
constitutional adjudication. The traditional weapon of choice in these cases was at 
one time the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
applied to land use regulations in the first zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co.119 Although “substantive due process,” has been in decline since West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish120 and the famous “footnote 4” in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,121 the doctrine is still alive in two ways. First, 
notwithstanding its formal rejection of substantive due process as an element of 
takings litigation, the United States Supreme Court still uses broad, extra-
constitutional phrases like “justice and fairness” to justify intrusive review into ad 
hoc state and local land use decision-making, though not yet applying those terms 
at the policy-making level.122 Second, state courts continue to follow pre-1937 
 
119 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
120 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
121 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This footnote attempted to limit the use of substantive due 
process to legislation that either violates specific constitutional protections, restricts political 
processes, or harms “discrete and insular minorities.” Id. 
122 The Supreme Court’s first two “conditions” cases, Nollan and Dolan, both referred to a passage 
from Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), to the effect that one of the principal 
purposes of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Nollan 
v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
384 (1994). Then there is the bold and unsupported comment regarding the special constitutional 
status of land under the Takings Clause as part of our “constitutional culture.” Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992). In addition, there is the resurrection of the 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine in Dolan and Koontz. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Koontz v. St. 
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federal precedent when interpreting their own state constitutional due process 
clauses.123 To the extent that the doctrine is still alive, however, a landowner 
seeking to challenge legislation or policy on substantive due process grounds has 
a difficult burden.124 
As mentioned in Part II, the United States Supreme Court has been 
reticent to entertain facial takings challenges to laws or policies that might, in 
some applications, be constitutional and valid. For example, in Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,125 which involved mining regulations 
similar to those found unconstitutional in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon126 
except for the availability of administrative relief, the Court refused to find the 
regulations unconstitutional unless and until such administrative relief had 
actually been sought.127 Thus, in order to be “ripe” for judicial review, an 
applicant must have utilized all available administrative remedies before bringing 
 
John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013); see also Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward 
J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Through the Just Compensation Clause: Understanding 
Koontz’s “Special Application” of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions by Tracing the 
Doctrine’s History, 46 URB. L. 569 (2014). 
123 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 471 
(2007). 
124 Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. sets out this heavy burden and 
contrasts it with the various tests in a takings inquiry: 
Although Agins’ reliance on due process precedents is understandable, the 
language the Court selected was regrettably imprecise. The “substantially 
advances” formula suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a 
regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public 
purpose. An inquiry of this nature has some logic in the context of a due process 
challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental 
objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process 
Clause. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 846 (1998) 
(stating that the Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to protect the individual 
against “the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service 
of a legitimate governmental objective”). But such a test is not a valid method of 
discerning whether private property has been “taken” for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). The Supreme Court appears to reserve most of its substantive 
due process jurisprudence for matters of privacy as well as personal and family interests. 
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
125 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
126 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
127 See also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
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a takings claim to the courts.128 This requirement, that a land use decision be 
“final” before it is justiciable, is deeply rooted in American takings 
jurisprudence.129 
As set out in Part III, there is no legislative requirement for residential 
developments to provide affordable housing in England. Nor does national policy 
stipulate a uniform percentage of residential development which must be 
affordable. Instead, the requirement to provide affordable housing is found in 
planning policies promulgated at the local level. While local plans almost 
invariably require some degree affordable housing contribution from residential 
developments within their area, the amount and type of that contribution very 
much depends on the socio-economic characteristics of the area in question. 
Importantly, the “requirement” to provide affordable housing in local plans is 
merely a policy requirement. It does not have the force of law. While there is a 
statutory presumption that the policies in local plans—including those for 
 
128 See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). As the Court observed in that case: 
As in Hodel, Agins, and Penn Central, then, respondent has not yet obtained a 
final decision regarding how it will be allowed to develop its property. Our 
reluctance to examine taking claims until such a final decision has been made is 
compelled by the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation 
Clause. Although “[t]he question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable 
difficulty,” this Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of 
particular significance in the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged 
action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative 
agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the 
regulations at issue to the particular land in question. 
Id. at 190–91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the 
landowner had not even applied for development before making a facial challenge to the 
land use regulation at issue. See 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Similarly, in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the plaintiff railroad had neither appealed the 
historic designation of its property nor challenged previous development denials before 
bringing an unsuccessful facial challenge. See 438 U.S. 108, 115–16, 118 (1978). 
129 For approximately 34 years, in addition to Williamson County’s “final decision” requirement, 
landowners with takings claims against state and local governments were generally required to 
utilize state procedures before bringing those claims in federal court. See Williamson County, 473 
U.S. at 194-95. In June of 2019, however, the Supreme Court overruled this “state litigation” 
requirement. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019); Edward J. Sullivan, In the Knick 
of Time: The Supreme Court Provides Direct Relief to Takings Claimants, 42 ZONING & PLAN. L. 
REP., Oct. 2019. 
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affordable housing—will be applied, that presumption is rebuttable on a case-by-
case basis.130 
Further, legal limits on the amount of affordable housing that local plans 
can require are more theoretical than real. It might be the case, for instance, that a 
policy requiring eighty or ninety percent of new homes to be affordable would run 
afoul of both European Union law on free movement of capital and Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the basis that 
such an imposition would be disproportionate. In reality, though, legal limitations 
present little, if any, difficulties for local authorities wishing to justify policies 
requiring significant affordable housing contributions from residential developers. 
Instead, disputes over those requirements involve merits-based arguments 
concerning the need for affordable housing in the relevant area and the impact of 
those requirements on the viability of the development. Meta-legal review of the 
kind found in the United States, where broad constitutional provisions may affect 
the legal viability of local planning policy, is simply not a factor. 
B. Requirements Imposed on an Ad Hoc Basis 
In America, while there is a plethora of cases in which the application of 
land use regulations is challenged under substantive due process, Supreme Court 
precedent has yet to evaluate development conditions on those grounds.131 And 
while the Takings Clause is the current weapon of choice since Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,132 the application of that doctrine to land 
use matters has hardly amounted to more than a series of “judgment calls.” In 
determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, Penn Central does not 
 
130 See infra Section IV.B (discussing ad hoc requirements). 
131 The reason for this may lie in the peculiar history of Supreme Court review of land use cases. 
Among the first “as applied” cases was Nectow v. City of Cambridge, in which the validity of 
“split lot” zoning designations was measured against a substantive due process standard. See 277 
U.S. 183 (1928). While the first four American land use cases, decided between 1926 and 1928, 
used only substantive due process to evaluate constitutional claims, the Supreme Court did not 
review another land use case until 1978. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 438 
U.S. 104 (1978). By that time, substantive due process was largely unutilized, if not discredited, 
and the Court began to evaluate the constitutionality of land use regulations under the Takings 
Clause. This is not to say that substantive due process has played no role in the recent 
constitutional adjudication of land use disputes. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, the Court concluded that a local government could not define “family” 
for zoning purposes to prohibit a grandmother from living with her two grandsons from different 
parents. See id. As such, the Takings Clause was inapplicable. The case is sui generis, however, 
and has not been used to create a new constitutional test. 
132 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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speak in terms of a checklist of elements, but rather a set of “factors” rooted in the 
factual circumstances of each case.133 Due to their shifting nature, the application 
of these factors in one case often provides little useful guidance for their 
application in subsequent cases.134 
In cases involving development conditions, application of the Takings 
Clause requires a court to determine whether there is a “nexus” between the 
condition itself and a legitimate ground for permit denial135 and whether the 
condition is “roughly proportional” to the purported harm caused by granting the 
permit.136 More significant is the shifting of the burden to the local government to 
justify conditions requiring the dedication of land under Nollan and Dolan, and 
the performance of public works or payment of money after Koontz. 
No party can be certain of the outcome in such a situation. The developer 
puts her development in jeopardy by challenging conditions—investing in 
uncertain litigation and putting future relations with the local government at risk. 
Local governments risk engendering civil rights claims, with the prospect of 
having to pay damages, attorney fees, and costs should the developer prevail. The 
flexibility and uncertainty of judicial review criteria make all parties uneasy. 
In England, the lack of any legislative requirement to provide affordable 
housing necessarily means that affordable housing provision is secured on a case-
by-case basis. As noted in Part I, however, securing planning permission for 
residential developments of ten or more dwellings will generally be contingent on 
a proportion of those dwellings being affordable. If a landowner-developer fails to 
provide a sufficient amount of affordable housing this can, and often does, justify 
a denial of planning permission for the development. Ordinarily, the amount of 
affordable housing will only be considered sufficient if it is “policy-compliant” 
(i.e., at a level consistent with the relevant local plan). In individual cases, 
however, landowner-developers may justify providing a lower level of affordable 
housing, particularly where it can be demonstrated that the affordable housing 
requirement would, when taken together with all of the other developer 
contributions, render the development unviable. Despite its apparent ad hoc 
nature, as is borne from empirical evidence set out in Part III, affordable housing 
 
133 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
134 There are, however, two “categorical” takings (i.e., circumstances under which a taking is 
found in almost every case): physical invasions and the denial of all viable economic use of land. 
See supra notes 48–50. 
135 See supra note 51–52 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra note 53–54 and accompanying text. 
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provision is a central part of the English planning system. Save for small 
developments of fewer than ten houses, or larger developments where viability is 
an issue, the provision of affordable housing is virtually a pre-requisite to the 
granting of planning permission for residential development. 
Again, the law in England plays a limited role in determining when 
affordable housing is required and, when it is, the requisite level and type. These 
are matters of planning judgement for local authorities and, on appeal, the 
Secretary of State for Housing, Communities, and Local Government. They are 
not questions that the courts  will entertain. Moreover, the legal limitations on 
such obligations are primarily procedural in nature137 and, even where 
substantive,138 are easily met. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Oscar Wilde may have said it first when describing the relationship 
between England and America: “[W]e have really everything in common with 
America nowadays, except, of course, language.”139 Language aside, the legal 
systems of the two countries, while sharing a common heritage, are divergent in 
their views of personal, planning, and property rights and, where constitutionally 
permissible, have responded to the necessities of time and place (in this case, the 
need to provide affordable housing) in very different ways. 
In the United States, constitutional objections, both perceived and actual, 
and the prospect of civil rights litigation, give more leverage to the landowner-
developer. In particular, uncertainty over whether conditions requiring affordable 
housing can, consistent with the Takings Clause, be imposed at all or only in 
certain circumstances is a very real concern. Given the incremental, and very 
occasional, nature of constitutional litigation, the tendency may, at least in the 
short run, be to find other ways to deal with the issue. To avoid litigation and its 
costs (in time, funds, and uncertainty), Americans may find it easier to 
affirmatively incentivize developers to provide affordable housing sooner, rather 
than later, and in greater numbers. 
England combines the legislative and executive functions through a 
ministerial system with ultimate parliamentary authority and fewer constitutional 
 
137 Such as the requirement to comply with section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1990. See supra Section III.C. 
138 See Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948, § 122(2). 
139 OSCAR WILDE, THE CANTERVILLE GHOST (1887). 
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constraints. Thus, policy may be implemented more quickly, and the allocation of 
costs and benefits is primarily a political, social, and economic calculus, rather 
than a legal one. The accepted discretionary nature of planning permission adds 
another level of flexibility to the process and provides local governments with 
more leverage to negotiate with developers over affordable housing than they 
possess in the United States. Much, then, will depend on the government of the 
day, as well as the individual decision-maker. 
In an era of population growth, cash-strapped local governments, and a 
desperate need for shelter, the problems associated with providing affordable 
housing are not going away anytime soon. Both England and the United States 
have apparent similarities in their legal systems; however, their approaches to 
providing sufficient affordable housing have widely divergent limitations and 
social and political expectations. Oscar Wilde’s comment is thus applicable to 
affordable housing, as well: we have a common need to secure the provision 
affordable housing, but our legal language to achieve that end is a study in 
cacophony. 
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